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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—National Labor Relations Act—Interpretation of
Section 7 Concerted Activities—NLRB v. Northern Metal Co. 1 —
Employee Davis, upon inquiring why he had not been paid for the
Labor Day holiday, was told by his employer that he was not en-
titled to holiday pay because he was still a probationary employee.'
Davis then consulted his shop steward and the local union's financial
secretary. Both informed Davis that the union could do nothing for
him because he was not a member of the union . 3
 Davis thereafter
obtained a copy of the collective bargaining contract which contained
a provision that employees were entitled to full pay for .seven holidays,
including Labor Day, subject only to the condition that any employee
claiming holiday pay must have worked the scheduled day before and
the scheduled day after the holiday. Davis informed his employer
that the contract's language did not exclude non-union or probation-
ary employees from its holiday pay provision. Thereupon, the em-
ployer accused Davis of "trying to tell me how to run my business."
Shortly thereafter, Davis was discharged.
Davis filed a complaint against the company with the National
Labor Relations Board, charging that his discharge was a viola-
tion of Section 8(a) (1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Section
8(a) (1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 . ." 4 Section 7 provides that employees shall
have the right to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 8
 The Board
determined that the company violated section 8(a) (1) and ordered
Davis' reinstatement!' The case went to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit on application of the NLRB, pursuant to Section 10(e)
of the National Labor Relations Act,7
 for enforcement of the order.
1 440 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1971).
2
 "The company did not, as a long standing practice acquiesced in by the Union,
pay holiday pay to probationary employees." 440 F.2d at 883 n.3.
3
 "Disputes of probationary employees were not subject to the contract's grievance
procedure." Id. n.4.
4
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
5
 Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides, in part, as follows:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection...."
The Board's Decision and Order are reported in 175 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 71
L.E.R.M. 1110 (1969).
7
 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970) states, in part:
"The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
States . . . within any circuit or district . . . wherein the unfair labor practice
in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the
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The court HELD: Davis was not engaged in concerted activities within
the protection of section 7 because his actions had not been for the
purpose of initiating, inducing, or preparing for group actions The
court therefore found it unnecessary to determine whether there was
substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that Davis' activ-
ities in attempting to obtain holiday pay were the cause of his dis-
missal.° In addition, the court indicated that had it found differently,
it would nonetheless have denied enforcement because the Board's
decision could not be considered reasonable and fair when viewed
on the record as a whole."
The primary question presented to the Northern Metal court was
whether a single employee acting alone was engaged in protected
activity when he pressed demands for holiday pay, to which he deemed
himself entitled under the provisions of the collective bargaining agree-
ment"- The Board urged the court to hold that the employee's efforts
constituted section 7 concerted activity. It contended that the neces-
sary element of concert could be supplied from the fact that the
employee presented a grievance which concerned the interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement and which affected rights of
all probationary employees.
The court rejected the theory of "constructive concerted activity"
as a legal fiction," and instead followed the more limited rule of Mush-
room Transportation Co. v. NLRB," an earlier Third Circuit decision,
which held that talk, in order to be protected as a concerted activity,
must be talk looking toward group, action." Mushroom involved a
part-time employee whose name was removed from the extra driver
list of the employer motor carrier. The evidence demonstrated that
the employee had made a habit of ' talking to other employees and
advising them as to their rights regarding questions of holiday pay
and vacations. The Board found that the employee's activities in gen-
eral were directly related to the other employees' legitimate interests
in terms and conditions of employment, and that it was not his prime
motive to advance his personal interest. The Board therefore con-
cluded that the employee's activities fell within the protected ambit
of section 7 concerted activities, and ordered the employee's reinstate-
ment with back pay."
On appeal, the Mushroom court found no evidence that the em-
enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining
order...."
8 440 F.2d at 884-85.
9
 Id. at 885.
10 Id. at 884, 886, citing Universal Camera Corp, v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490
(1951).
11 440 F.2d at 884.
12 id.
18 330 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1964).
'u Id. at 685,
18 142 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 53 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1963).
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ployee's talks with fellow employees involved any effort on his or their
part to initiate or promote any concerted action to deal with com-
plaints and grievances which they may have discussed." The court
stated that in order for conversation to constitute concerted activity,
it must appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the
object of initiating, inducing or preparing for group action, or that
it had some relation to group action in the interest of the employees."
Activity, which consists of mere talk, in order to be protected, must
be talk looking toward group action; activity which looks forward
to no action at all is more than likely to be mere "griping!" 13 The
court held that there was no evidence that any question of group
action had entered into the conversations and that the employee was
therefore not engaged in protected concerted activities."
It is submitted that the Mushroom court gave section 7 an overly
strict interpretation in holding that an individual's activities not in-
tended to induce or prepare for group action are unprotected, regard-
less of whether the results of the activities might benefit the group."
Thus, under Mushroom, employers have relatively wide freedom in
dealing with troublesome or "gripe" prone employees.
The Northern Metal court also supported its holding with the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Indiana Gear Works v. NLRB. 21 This
case involved an employee who prepared and displayed cartoons rid-
iculing both a wage increase and the company's president. The Board
reversed the decision of its trial examiner and held that the em-
ployee's discharge was a violation of section 8(a) (1). 22 The court
applied the rule that, in order to prove concerted activity under
section 7, it is necessary to demonstrate that the activity was for the
purpose of inducing or preparing for group action to correct a griev-
ance. The court found no evidence in the record demonstrating that
the employee prepared and posted the cartoons for the purpose of
inducing or preparing for any group action by the employees." In-
18 330 F.2d at 684-85.
17 Id. at 685.
13 Id.
19 Id,
20 The Ninth Circuit, in Signal OH and Gas Co. v. NLRB, gave a broader interpre-
tation to the Mushroom language that "a conversation may constitute a concerted activ-
ity" if it appears "that it had some relation to group action in the interest of the
employees." It held that a single non-union employee's comment to another non-union
employee that he hoped the union would carry out a threatened strike was protected
because it was supportive of joint action. 390 F.2d 338, 343 (9th Cir. 1968). Although
the Signal court was aware of the necessity of some relationship of speech to group
action, it was adamant on its view that individual utterances supporting joint action
should be protected. "To employees as to other groups in society, speech—whether di-
rected at a multitude or at a single listener—is often an essential means of achieving
(albeit slowly and indirectly) social or economic goals." Id.
21
 371 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1967).
22
 The Board's Decision and Order are reported in 156 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 61 L.R.R.M.
1056 (1965).
23
 371 F.2d at 276.
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stead, the court agreed with the Board's trial examiner, who had found
that the employee was merely satisfying his own personal whim or
gratification by carrying out habitual sarcastic reflections against
those for and with whom he worked.'
The most expansive interpretation of section 7 concerted activ-
ities as viewed by the Mushroom and Indiana Gear Works courts
would go no further than protecting talk looking toward group action.
This interpretation does not give protection to an employee, such as
the one in Northern Metal, who, alone, asserts a claim arising out of
a collective bargaining agreement. However, individual efforts to en-
force a collective bargaining agreement were held to be protected
under section 7 in NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 25 which
formed the basis for the dissenting opinion in Northern Metal. Inter-
boro involved two employees who complained to their employer about
alleged violations of the collective bargaining contract. The employees
were discharged. The Board determined that the employer had vio-
lated section 8(a) (1) and ordered the reinstatement of the employees. 20
In granting the Board's petition for enforcement of its order, the
Second Circuit stated that "while interest on the part of fellow em-
ployees would indicate a concerted purpose, activities involving at-
tempts to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
may be deemed to be for concerted purposes even in the absence
of such interest by fellow employees."27
The Second Circuit subsequently qualified its Interboro rationale
in NLRB v. John Langenbacher Co., 28
 wherein it stated that an at-
tempt by employees to enforce their understanding of the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement "is a protected activity . . . if the em-
ployees have a reasonable basis for believing that their understanding
of the terms was the understanding that had been agreed upon . . . . 7720
Thus, efforts by an individual employee to enforce a provision of a
collective bargaining contract are not protected concerted activity
per se. Rather, it would seem that individual claims by employees will
be statutorily protected only if a condition of reasonableness exists as
to interpretation of the contractual provisions in issue.
The Interboro approach was followed in NLRB v. Selwyn Shoe
Mfg. Corp.," where the Eighth Circuit stated that "[w]e think it
obvious that rights secured by such . .. [a collective bargaining]
agreement, though personal to each employee, are protected rights
under § 7 of the Act because the collective bargaining agreement is
the result of concerted activities by the employees for their mutual
24 Id. at 277.
25 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
20 157 N.L.R.B. No. 110, 61 L.R.R.M. 1537 (1966).
27 388 F.2d at 500.
28 398 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1968).
20 Id. at 463 (emphasis added).
so 428 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1970).
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aid and protection."" The Selwyn Shoe court held that it was an
unfair labor practice for the employer to discharge an employee for
vigorously presenting a personal grievance based upon a clause in
the collective bargaining agreement. 82
Selwyn Shoe may be distinguished from Northern Metal by noting
that in Selwyn, the employee was utilizing the union grievance pro-
cedure which was available to her. However, the Northern Metal em-
ployee could not invoke the grievance machinery available to regular
employees since he was a non-union probationary employee. Yet, as
the Northern Metal dissent indicated, it would be unfair to deny the
benefits provided by the National Labor Relations Act to probation-
ary employees who are not yet entitled to utilize the union grievance
machinery" while extending benefits to regular employees who are
entitled to process their grievances through the union."
The dissent further stated that "although an individual employee,
in processing his complaint based upon a contractual provision, might
be concerned primarily with accomplishing a result which will benefit
him personally, his success will redound to the direct benefit of all
employees similarly situated.”" In Northern Metal, the employee was
concerned primarily with convincing his employer that he was en-
titled to holiday pay under the collective bargaining agreement. How-
ever, the employee was, in effect, representing all other probationary
employees (both present and future) for, if successful, his efforts
would benefit this entire class of persons. It is therefore submitted
that this status should generate inclusion of the employee's actions
within the ambit of protected section 7 activities.
Both the majority and the dissent agreed that even if the Inter-
boro rule were followed, it would still be necessary under Langen-
backer" to remand the case to the Board for a finding as to whether
the employee had had a reasonable basis for believing he was en-
titled to holiday pay under the collective bargaining contract'? The
majority determined that the trial examiner's findings of fact clearly
showed that the examiner had not considered whether there had been
a reasonable basis for the employee's belief. He found, simply, that
the employee was discharged for pressing for holiday pay to which
81 Id. at 221.
32 Id.
83 440 F.2d at 887 n.l.
84 The recent decision of the Board in J.A. Ferguson Constr. Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No.
165, 68 L.R.R.M. 1578 (1968) illustrates the superficiality of any attempt to make this
distinction. In extending protection to an employee who had not availed himself of the
contract's grievance procedure, the Board ruled that "his conduct, nevertheless, constituted
concerted activity since the 'grievance' pertained to a violation of a condition of employ-
ment prescribed in the contract, affecting not only [this employee] but also all the brick-
layers on the job." Id., 68 L.R.R.M. at 1579.
88 440 F.2d at 888.
88 See discussion at text accompanying note 28 supra.
87 440 F.2d at 885, 888.
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he thought he was entitled under the collective bargaining contract."
Langenbacher did not indicate what factors, other than examining the
language of the contract itself, should be considered in determining
whether an employee has a reasonable basis for his grievance or
complaint. A number of cases, however, have noted several obvious
factors that should be. considered. A mere "gripe" has been held not
protected," nor a complaint made out of malice and in bad faith.'
Therefore, for an employee to be protected, it would seem essential
that he have a bona fide purpose in implementing or interpreting the
bargaining agreement. The language of Interboro suggests that a griev-
vance or complaint concerning a provision of a collective bargaining
contract is not protected if it is "fabricated for personal motives.""
The Interboro rationale has been followed by the NLRB in
recent years." As compared with the Mushroom rule, Interboro is
more consistent with the language of Section 7 and the basic policy
of the Act. The scope of the words "concerted activities" may be
ascertained by noting the statutory language immediately following
in section 7: "for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection" (emphasis added). It has also been made clear
that section 7 is for the benefit of employees and not the union."
Thus, it is suggested that, under this interpretation of the statutory
language, it may be concluded that concerted activity exists if there
is some reasonable relationship connecting an employee's activity with
the "mutual aid or protection" of other employees, and if such activ-
ity is based upon rights of the group recognized within the bargaining
agreement. The requisite relationship to mutual aid or protection can
be inferred if the effect of the activity is to benefit other employees."
It is also submitted that activity looking toward the implementation
of a bargaining agreement is encompassed in the explicit language of
section 7 which protects the right to "assist labor organizations."
In further support of the individual's right to be protected in
activities involving enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement,
it should be pointed out that Congress has indirectly sanctioned the
88 Id. at 885.
89
 Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
Office Towel Supply Co., Inc., 201 F.2d 838, 841 (2d Cir. 1953).
48
 Socony Mobile OiI Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1966); Joanna
Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949).
41 388 F.2d at 500 (emphasis added).
42 See, e.g,, H.C. Smith Constr. Co., 174 N.L.R.B. No. 180, 70 L.R.R.M. 1462 (1969);
New York Trap Rock Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 56 L.R.R.M. 1526 (1964); B&M Ex-
cavating, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 60 L.R.R,M. 1466 (1965) (dictum), enforced per
curiam, 368 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1966); Bunney Bros. Constr. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. No. 133,
51 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962).
43 NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 1945).
44
 International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 299 F.2d 114, 117
(D.C. Cir. 1962).
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individual processing of grievances in Section 9(a) of the Act." This
section allows any individual employee to present grievances to his
employer without the intervention of the union and to have such
grievances adjusted, so long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Congress clearly
intended through sections 9 and 7 to recognize that an individual
employee's rights are not totally submerged by the group when as-
sertion of those rights is otherwise consistent with the interest of
the group. It has been stated that "to reason otherwise is to deny
the very purpose for which the union exists; that is, the protection
of the rights of the individual employee."'"
A second question presented in Northern Metal was whether
the court correctly interpreted the scope of judicial review of NLRB
decisions as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB: 47
We conclude, therefore, that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act direct that courts must
now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and
fairness of Labor Board decisions than some courts have
shown in the past. Reviewing courts must be influenced by
a feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judi-
cial function. Congress has imposed on them responsibility for
assuring that the Board keeps within reasonable grounds.
That responsibility is not less real because it is limited to en-
forcing the requirement that evidence appear substantial
when viewed, on the record as a whole, by courts invested
with the authority and enjoying the prestige of the Courts of
Appeals. The Board's findings are entitled to respect; but they
must nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court
of Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision from being
justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of
witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its spe-
cial competence or both."
The Northern Metal court took a broad view of its mandate
under Universal Camera and stated that even if it had found differently
on the issue of 'the interpretation of "concerted activities," its respon-
45 29 U.S.C. 0 159(a) (1970) provides:
"Representatives ... selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees . . . shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee . . . shall have the right at any time
to present grievances to [his) employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative. . ."
48 Illinois Ruan Transp. Carp. v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 274, 289 (8th Cir. 1968) (dis-
senting opinion).
47 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
48 Id. at 490.
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Sibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Board decisions would
require the court to deny enforcement of the order. The court sug-
gested that the Board would have to explain, by remand to its trial
examiner or in some other way, the trial examiner's crediting that
amount of the employee's testimony needed to make out a case against
the company, while rejecting part of the employee's testimony as "im-
plausible.""
It is submitted that the responsibility of courts of appeal for the
reasonableness and fairness of Board decisions arises from, and is
limited by, their responsibility for insuring that the evidence sup-
porting the Board's decision appears substantial when viewed on the
record as a whole. The National Labor Relations Act provides that
"[t] he findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole
shall be conclusive."" The Supreme Court in Universal Camera held
that the scope of review under the NLRA is the same as that required
in the Administrative Procedure Act," which directs reviewing courts
to set aside agency findings unsupported by substantial evidence."
The Court has construed substantial evidence to be "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.' The responsibility of a court to view the record as a
whole in determining the substantiality of evidence requires that it
take into account the body of evidence opposed to the Board's deci-
sion."
It would appear, therefore, that the inquiry in Northern Metal
should have been whether there was substantial evidence on the
record as a whole to support the Board's decision." The substantial
evidence rule directs the court's attention to whether the Board could
reasonably have made the finding." Because the record includes the
examiner's report," it has been argued that the court, in making its
determination, may properly consider the fact that an experienced
trial examiner who saw and heard the witnesses made the findings
that he did. 58
 Universal Camera determined that nothing in the
statutes suggests that the Board should not be influenced by the
49 440 F.2d at 886.
58 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
51 340 U.S. at 487.
82 5 U.S.C.	 706 (1970).
88
 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
54 340 U.S. at 488,
50
 In the recent case of Ginsburg v. Richardson, the Third Circuit stated that "it is
unnecessary for this court to be in accord with all of the examiner's findings and reason-
ing as long as his ultimate conclusion is based upon substantial evidence." 436 F.2d 1146,
1151 (3d Cir. 1971).
58 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.11 (1958).
87 340 U.S. at 493.
88
 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 10.04 (1958).
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examiner's opportunity to observe witnesses he hears and sees and
which the Board does not."
Universal Camera does not alter the primary function of the
Board in making fact determinations. The requirement for canvassing
the whole record in order to ascertain substantiality is not intended
to reduce the role of the Board as one of those agencies presumably
equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field
of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority
of expertise which courts do not possess and therefore must respect u°
Nor does it mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court
may displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views!".
Therefore, as the Northern Metal dissent suggested, it would be per-
missible in satisfying the substantial evidence test for the trial ex-
aminer to reject only part of the employee's testimony without rejecting
all of it."
It is submitted that the Northern Metal holding that an individual
employee is not engaged in protected concerted activity when he at-
tempts, outside of the grievance machinery, to enforce rights under
a collective bargaining agreement thwarts the purposes of the Act—
the promotion of harmony in labor-management relations and the
recognition of the individual's right to engage in activities for mutual
protection and individual security. It is true that the overall policy
of the Act may be better served if the employee processes his griev-
ance through the union representative. However, as the facts of
Northern Metal demonstrate, this avenue is not always available to
the employee. In any case, where the employee is asserting a right
which he has a reasonable basis to believe is provided by the col-
lective bargaining contract, both Sections 7 and 9 of the Act give
him the right to proceed alone.
PHILLIP A. WICKY
Administrative Law—Due Process Implications in Agency Pro-
ceedings—Sterling National Bank of Davie v. Camp. 1—Appellant,
a bank in Davie, Florida, brought suit to invalidate the granting of
a national bank charter by the Comptroller of the Currency to a
group of individuals wishing to establish a new national bank in
Davie. Both proponents and opponents of the proposed bank were
given the opportunity to present evidence at a hearing to consider
the propriety of chartering the new bank. The complaint alleged that
despite evidence in the administrative file supporting his action, award
59 340 U.S. at 495.
69 Id. at 488.
61 Id.
62 440 F.2d at 889.
431 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
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